Ukraine’s wartime nationalism. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 179,  28.08.2015 by Olszanski, Tadeusz A.
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 179
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 179 | 28.08.2015
Ukraine’s wartime nationalism
Tadeusz A. Olszański
The Euromaidan revolution and the war in 
Donbas that followed it have brought about 
deep changes in the way Ukrainian citizens 
think and have led to a rapid transformation 
of how people view the concept of natio-
nal community. It began to be increasingly 
common for proponents of nationalism to 
refer to solidarity with the state instead of 
referring to the nation understood as an 
ethnic community, as they had previously 
done. This is due to the fact that an entire 
young generation has matured which takes 
the Ukrainian state for granted, but also be-
cause in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict most 
Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine have 
opted for Ukraine.
The war with Russia, which has now been on-
going for over a year, has led to a significant 
radicalisation of society’s attitudes and to 
attempts to seek models of military actions 
from the past that could serve as reference 
points in contemporary thinking. In Ukraine, 
the main, if not the only clear-cut model of 
this type of action, has been the story taught 
in schools involving fighting carried out by 
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1943–
–1952 (the narrative omits the crimes perpe-
trated by this formation – not only those aga-
inst ethnic Poles). One consequence of this 
has been the currently observed wide-scale 
adoption of OUN-UPA symbols including by 
groups dominated by Russian-speaking re-
sidents of central and eastern Ukraine. This, 
however, is not accompanied by the adoption 
of the ideology of these historical organisa-
tions. Even when activists and columnists 
refer directly to Stepan Bandera, his actual 
views remain largely unknown. A new phe-
nomenon has emerged which so far has been 
of marginal importance, but which has large 
potential to develop: neo-Nazism which re-
fers to contemporary European neo-Nazism 
instead of Banderite traditions.
Another new trend has been the accelerated 
weakening of the trend which involves asso-
ciating nationality with language alone, and 
which used to be a typical element of Ukra-
inian nationalist thinking. The fact of using 
the Ukrainian language has ceased to be the 
main determinant of identity. This makes 
it possible to devise a new concept of the 
Ukrainian nation – understood not as a com-
munity based on strictly ethnic criteria, but 
a civic, political community which include all 
citizens who are loyal towards the state. 
At this point in time it is difficult to descri-
be the rapid transformations of the Ukra-
inian national concept in detail. It is not cle-
ar which of the currently emerging trends 
will prove stable and which will be merely 
ephemeral. Much will depend on further de-
velopments, especially on the course of the 
war and the manner in which the territory of 
the Donets Basin will (or will not) be re-inte-
grated with the rest of Ukraine. This text is 
devoted to a conceptual evolution which has 
been evident in Ukrainian nationalism in the 
last year and a half. It omits changes – altho-
ugh they are significant – which have occur-
red since late 2013 and which have involved 
the nationalist movement understood as 
a conglomerate of organisations and groups.
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Ukrainian nationalism 
(an attempt at a definition)
Various definitions of nationalism have been 
proposed. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, na-
tionalism is a synonym for a sense or an idea 
of a nation, it is mainly free from negative as-
sociations. In Poland, for a concept to be clas-
sified as nationalism it must involve a convic-
tion that one nation is superior to (better than) 
other nations. In the Polish tradition, unlike 
in the Anglo-Saxon one, the national communi-
ty is clearly separate from civic community and 
is granted priority in the axiological hierarchy. 
The Ukrainian concept of nationalism is closer 
to the Anglo-Saxon one – it involves the convic-
tion that Ukrainians understand the Ukrainian 
nation as being the ultimate value (on the list of 
political values), and that the fatherland is the 
most important value in the life of society and 
in the lives of individual citizens. There is, how-
ever, a strong trend towards placing national 
community (defined not so much in ethnic as 
in linguistic categories) above political com-
munity. This view had until recently been pre-
dominant in western Ukraine, where so-called 
“integral nationalism”1 emerged. In Poland, 
1 In Ukrainian integral nationalism, the nation was con-
sidered an organic community (in which the fact of be-
longing to a nation does not depend on the person’s 
will) which has been permanent and unchanged for 
centuries; integral nationalism also challenged internal 
divisions (social classes). It rejected representative de-
mocracy and opted for a totalitarian state which would 
be ruled by ‘a national organisation’, it supported the 
concept of eliminating the influence of religion on social 
life and of building an ‘ethnically clean’ state. 
this view is usually associated with OUN ideol-
ogy. Integral nationalism, which refers to views 
popular in the 1930s, has recently become less 
prominent, in part due to the fact that it proved 
to be intellectually helpless against challanges 
for Ukrainians and Ukraine of the second dec-
ade of the 21st century. 
The 20th-century ethnocentric Ukrainian nation-
alism targeted mainly Poles and Jews, as well as 
Hungarians and Romanians, leaving the “Rus-
sian question” to one side. By now, the conflict 
with Poland and Poles has been ultimately re-
solved. Similarly, there is no significant Jewish 
minority2. The presence not so much of Rus-
sians but of the Russian language and culture 
in Ukraine is seen as the most important issue. 
Moreover, today the organic (radically collectiv-
ist) concept of the nation, which used to form 
the basis for OUN’s version of nationalism, 
is difficult to comprehend for younger genera-
tions which have been raised in the spirit of indi-
vidualism3. Currently, in Ukraine any view which 
defines the Ukrainian nation in ethno-historical 
terms (that is, in opposition towards Russia and 
Poland) is considered nationalism. Recently, na-
tionalists have ever more frequently referred 
to Ukrainian traditions of statehood, mainly to 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic which existed 
in 1917–1920, as well as to tradition associated 
with the independence/autonomy of the Cos-
sack community  in the 17th century. This trend 
does not eliminate opposition towards Russia, 
but it shifts the balance from the ethnic aspect 
to the institutional one. Moreover, it paves 
2 Before the outbreak of World War II, at least 3 million 
Jews lived in the territory of contemporary Ukraine. To-
day this number appears to be less than 200,000 (the 
number estimated according to the 2001 census was 
approximately 100,000 but was overly conservative and 
is also now out of date).
3 This explains e.g. the failed attempts by older genera-
tion Banderites aimed at creating one country-wide na-
tionalist organisation. The trend to establish numerous, 
mutually hostile and often ephemeral organisations and 
groups proved to be stronger. The recruitment slogan 
currently used by the Ukrainian military: “A strong army 
– a strong you” may serve as an interesting example of 
individualist trends in contemporary Ukraine. It refers not 
to the “fatherland”,  “state” or “country”, but to “you”. 
The fact of using the Ukrainian language 
has ceased to be the main determinant 
of identity. This makes it possible to de-
vise a new concept of the Ukrainian nation 
which include all citizens who are loyal 
towards the state.
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the way for the inclusion of concepts such 
as identity and civil solidarity into the catalogue 
of nationalist views. This is due mainly to the 
fact that the Ukrainian state has existed for al-
most 25 years, as well as to the fact that its 
existence has been threatened for over a year 
now. Over the past year, there emerged a con-
cept of “state nationalism”, or civic nationalism.
Ukrainian nationalism 
and the ‘Russian challenge’
Ukrainian debate over nationalism and over 
the essence of national community has been 
carried out in constant opposition towards 
the Great-Russian, imperialist approach to the 
Ukrainian nation as a concept and as reality. 
According to this approach, Ukrainians in fact 
are Little-Russians, their language is a dialect 
of Russian which has been spoilt by Polish influ-
ence, their culture is a regional variety of Rus-
sian culture, and their concept of national sep-
arateness has been inspired by Russia’s external 
enemies (previously – Poland, the Vatican and 
Germany, and at present mainly the USA). 
This view used to be shared by residents of 
eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as by 
residents of big cities nationwide. The concept 
of Ukrainians being Little-Russians (i.e. a sepa-
rate group within the Russian nation) began to 
lose its popularity as the status of the Ukrainian 
state grew stronger. For some time, the con-
cept itself became less emphasised by Russian 
propaganda. However, the concept remained 
strong among older generations and in groups 
centred around Soviet-era migrants, predomi-
nantly Russian-speaking and only mildly assimi-
lated into Ukrainian society. 
In the Soviet era, the leadership of Ukraine paid 
little heed to official rhetoric and attempted to 
prevent, or at least hinder, the integration of 
residents of Eastern Galicia with the rest of the 
Ukrainian nation. For this purpose, inhabitants of 
this region were referred to as ‘banderas’ (which 
carried a clear association with bandits) and trai-
tors who had fought the Red Army as support-
ers of the Third Reich. Similarly, as early as in the 
1960s, if not earlier, the Ukrainian language be-
gan to be referred to as “Banderite speech”.
The narrative which associated the Ukrainians’ 
focus on their own language, culture and liter-
ature, their attempts at finding their own way 
within the Orthodox Church, as well as at shap-
ing their own state independent of Russia, with 
radical nationalism, or even fascism, returned 
with new force after 2010, when the concept 
of the Russian world (Russkiy mir) began to be 
promoted. In 2014–2015, as a result of the Revo-
lution of Dignity and the outbreak of the war in 
Donbas, this line of propaganda became more 
prominent. The new government in Kyiv began 
to be referred to as a “fascist junta” and ‘Ban-
derites’, and plans to bring about a Ukrainian 
rapprochement with the European Union were 
seen as manifestations of ‘Banderite ideology’ 
advocated by this government. Additionally, 
these allegations were similar to views shared 
by European extreme nationalists, who con-
sider the actions carried out by the Third Reich 
as the first attempt at achieving ‘Euro-integra-
tion’4. To cast Ukrainian voluntary and regular 
units in a negative light, the extremely defama-
tory term of ‘karateli’, also rooted in World War 
II reality, began to be used to describe them5. 
4 Cf. e.g. Vladyslav Rachynsky, Uroki Pobiedy i otnosheni-
ye k pobieditieliam, [in:] Kommientarii. Analitchieskiy 
jezheniedielnik no. 17 of 2015. 
5 In the USSR, ‘karateli’ (literally “punishers”) were mem-
bers of auxiliary police units of the Third Reich recruited 
from among residents of occupied territory; they were 
often used to perform bloody pacifications of villages, 
referred to as “punitive operations”. The term has no 
good counterpart in Polish or in English. 
The fact of associating the fight for inde-
pendence with “fascism” inspired peo-
ple to refer to Banderite traditions (in the 
version taught in Ukrainian schools) and 
in this way to demonstrate resistance to-
wards hostile propaganda.
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This massive propaganda campaign quickly 
spread across Ukraine and triggered a para-
doxical reaction. The fact of associating the 
fight for independence with “fascism” inspired 
people to refer to Banderite traditions (in the 
version taught in Ukrainian schools) and in this 
way to demonstrate resistance towards hostile 
propaganda. This, however, did not encourage 
any references to the actual OUN doctrine or to 
Dontsov’s thought6, nor did it involve a return 
to ethnic exclusivism, a major concept in OUN 
ideology and, more generally, an important 
element of various lines of nationalism which 
emerged in the first half of the 20th century. 
Russia’s propaganda-fuelled interpretation of 
the current conflict is being accepted without 
much thought by numerous groups in EU coun-
tries for whom Nazism and anything related to 
it is the ultimate evil. Therefore, forces which 
fought Nazism (mainly the Soviet Union) are 
assessed as positive. As a consequence, those 
groups tend to ignore or even deny crimes per-
petrated by the Communist regime. Russia fre-
quently refers to this view and tries to empha-
sise it in its attempts to delegitimise not only 
the current government of Ukraine but also the 
very concept of Ukraine’s real independence.
Generation change and nationalism
A significant change in the Ukrainian national 
concept was associated with the emergence of 
the Ukrainian state. For those who witnessed 
its creation it turned out to be a durable enti-
ty, while the younger generation seems to be 
taking it as a given. Previously, the Ukraini-
an national concept had focused on a nation- 
-ethnos. Currently, there has emerged “state- 
6 Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) was a political activist and 
ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism. His views, which 
were convergent with interwar fascist ideology, served 
as an inspiration for OUN; the main difference was that 
Dontsov considered western Ukraine a marginal periph-
ery, whereas the OUN leadership saw it as key portion 
of Ukrainian national space. The fact that Dontsov em-
phasised the importance of the Dnieper region is likely 
to contribute to a revival of his intellectual heritage.
-centric nationalism” or civic nationalism. 
Although it places great emphasis on the issue 
of ethnicity, it does not exclude fellow citizens 
who do not belong to the Ukrainian ethnic com-
munity. In the meantime, a generation change 
was being observed: a whole new generation 
raised in Ukrainian schools and Ukrainian state 
traditions has now reached maturity. Young gen-
erations of Ukrainians, and partly also Ukrainian 
Russians and other minority groups (with Zakar-
pattia Hungarians as the least prominent group), 
began to identify themselves with the Ukrainian 
state (and not only with Ukraine asa country).
They also began to accept the official narrative 
of collective identity and the role of the Ukrain-
ian language as the symbolic and actual lan-
guage of state life. Moreover, as was to be sub-
sequently proven, the young generation turned 
out to be ready to fight for this state. 
There is, however, a downside to this situation. 
Not all Ukrainian Russians, including the young 
ones, accepted these changes, especially when 
it comes to replacing elements of the Rus-
sian-Soviet identity narrative with Ukrainian el-
ements. The most significant doubts concerned 
not so much the language as the questions 
whether so-called Kyivan Rus was an ‘Old Rus-
sian’ or an ‘Old Ukrainian’ state, whether Het-
man Mazepa was a traitor of the Russian Empire 
or a Ukrainian hero, or who should be consid-
ered the national poet: Pushkin or Shevchen-
ko etc. This dispute (involving both those who 
support the new narrative and those who re-
ject it) is being carried out not by reference to 
a thorough knowledge of these prominent fig-
ures and events, but by using clichés promoted 
The war has transformed an internal con-
flict which emphasised ethnic divides into 
an external, interstate conflict which fos-
ters the consolidation of civic attitudes, 
disregarding ethnic and political divides.
5OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 179
by schools and the media. These groups have 
seen the emergence of active, strong resistance 
which received ideological and organisation-
al support from the structures of Russkiy mir. 
This is how new Russian nationalism, which 
seems to be more ethnic than imperial, emerged 
in Ukraine. This, however, goes beyond the 
scope of this text. 
Previously, during the 2004 Orange Revolu-
tion, two important trends could be observed. 
On the one hand, the split into Ukrainian-speak-
ing and Russian-speaking citizens was being 
gradually eliminated. On the other hand, there 
was resistance towards the pro-Western (also 
meaning: pro-Ukrainian) orientation of the 
state. Ten years later, the division within soci-
ety became considerably stronger, and rallies 
against the Yanukovych regime and against the 
Eurasian option were organised also in cities 
in the central and eastern part of the country, 
including Donetsk. The scale of these rallies 
was much smaller than that seen in the events 
in Kyiv. It should be remembered, however, 
that ten years back no such protests could have 
been possible. 
The Revolution of Dignity and the war that fol-
lowed it have magnified this trend. This is be-
cause the revolution lasted much longer than the 
previous one and the war is still ongoing. The fact 
that the war has actually transformed an inter-
nal conflict which emphasised ethnic divides into 
an external, interstate conflict which fosters the 
consolidation of civic attitudes, disregarding eth-
nic and political divides is another reason.
War and nationalism
Participants in the 2014 Euromaidan protests 
were much more ethnically diverse than those 
who took part in the 2004 events. Among 
the first protesters killed in 2014 there was 
a Ukrainian ethnic Armenian (a son of Armeni-
an refugees) and an immigrant from Belarus. 
Other victims included at least two Ukrainian 
ethnic Poles (activists of Polish minority or-
ganisations). Numerous Ukrainian Jews took 
part in the revolution, which inspired Russian 
propaganda to coin a defamatory term ‘zhydo- 
-banderivtsy’7. This defamatory effect was 
quickly neutralised when this word was adopt-
ed as a proper name with a positive meaning, 
and when a graphic symbol combining the 
Ukrainian tryzub (trident) with the menorah 
was created. There were very few members of 
minority groups among the Euromaidan pro-
testers, however, it should be remembered that 
in Ukraine national minorities (excluding the 
Russian minority) are negligible (excluding Rus-
sians, none of the minority groups accounts for 
more than 0.5% of the country’s population).
Voluntary battalions, which decided to shoulder 
the burden of fighting separatists in the initial 
stage of the war, enabling the Ukrainian mili-
tary to take its time to reconstruct its combat 
potential, were composed mainly of residents 
of eastern Ukraine, including the Donets Basin. 
Most of them were and still are Russian-speak-
ing Ukrainians and Ukrainian Russians8. The sit-
uation is similar in the case of civilian volunteers 
who support the battalions and the military, 
currently numbering hundreds of thousands. 
Similarly, most members of regular units (mili-
tary and police units) are Russian-speaking resi-
dents of central and eastern Ukraine. 
7 Both in Russian and in Ukrainian (excluding the Halych 
dialect of Ukrainian), the term ‘zhyd’ (Jew) has negative 
connotations; the neutral word for a Jew is ‘yevrey’ (He-
brew).
8 For example: Semen Semenchenko, the first command-
er of the “Donbas” battalion, currently a parliamentar-
ian elected from the list submitted by the “Lviv-rooted 
Self-Reliance Party” is an ethnic Russian born in Sevas-
topol; until spring 2014 his name was Konstantin Grishin.
The war has turned out to be surprisingly 
deadly: so far, government forces have lost 
approximately 2,300 soldiers. This num-
ber corresponds to the number of Ukrain-
ians who died in the Soviet Army during 
the nine-year war in Afghanistan.
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So far, approximately 35,000–40,0009 individu-
als have served as members of voluntary units. 
A large portion of them have returned to civil-
ian life. Similarly, many servicemen have been 
demobilised. They have become local heroes: 
for their families, neighbours and local commu-
nities. In this way, the narrative associated with 
the new generation is gaining ground and this 
is happening faster than would normally be the 
case in a natural sequence of generations. 
The war has turned out to be surprisingly deadly: 
so far, government forces have lost approximate-
ly 2,300 soldiers10. This number corresponds 
to the number of Ukrainians who died in the 
Soviet Army during the nine-year war in Afghan-
istan. The war is all the more shocking for the 
public because the Afghan war was fought far 
away from Ukraine and Ukrainian civilians were 
not threatened by it. According to current esti-
mates, the number of civilian residents of eastern 
Ukraine killed so far is at least 7,00011.
Towards a new shape of nationalism
On the one hand, the development of events in 
Kyiv and in Donbas fostered the spreading of 
nationalist concepts and slogans. On the oth-
er hand, it promoted a milder rhetoric, which 
was evident especially in the case of ethnocen-
trism. In the initial stage of the Revolution of 
Dignity, the slogan “Glory to Ukraine – glory to 
9 The number of a battalion’s members used to change 
constantly; it seems that the maximum number of mem-
bers at a given time could have been 15,000–20,000. 
Cf estimates in: Siły zbrojne Ukrainy, stan na połowę 
stycznia 2015 roku, http://www.nowastrategia.org.pl/
sily-zbrojne-ukrainy-stan-polowe-stycznia-2015-r/; ac-
cessed 10.06.2015. 
10 This figure was quoted by the volunteer-run Memory 
Book of those killed for Ukraine (http://memorybook.
org.ua/; access 20.07.2015); official figures are smaller, 
as some of the killed individuals who had been members 
of voluntary units were not properly registered, espe-
cially in the initial stage of fighting. In late July 2015, 
Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence confirmed the figures 
compiled in the Memory Book. 
11 This figure was announced by President Poroshenko 
in his speech marking anniversary of the end of World 
War II (http://www.president.gov.ua/news/vistup-prezi-
denta-na-urochistomu-zasidanni-verhovnoyi-ra-
di-u-35270 access 20.07.2015). 
heroes!”, which stemmed from the OUN tradi-
tion, was received with mixed emotions in the 
Euromaidan. Some protesters were outright 
hostile towards the slogan, and the mood was 
dominated by pro-Western, patriotic-liberal at-
titudes12. When blood was shed, killed and in-
jured friends and relatives became heroes, and 
a war for Ukraine’s integrity and independence 
broke out, and the slogan began to be per-
ceived as a natural expression of wartime pat-
riotism. Back in 2013, only radical nationalists 
shouted it out; today, only Russophiles reject it. 
It is possible to state that it has become banal; 
and this makes it certain that it has become de-
tached from its historical roots, as with other 
symbols of this type. 
The increase in nationalist tendencies was tanta-
mount to abandoning traditional ethnocentric 
nationalism. Language and declared nationality 
were no longer the main determinants of one’s 
identity. These were being replaced with state 
solidarity, or civic solidarity, also referred to as 
nationalism – this nationalism, however, was 
common for everyone who fought for Ukraine 
and supported this fight.
At the same time, there emerged a trend involv-
ing a strong rejection – which had previously 
been absent in Ukraine – of all things Russian, 
which generally used to be perceived as close, 
even brotherly (mainly due to the linguistic sim-
ilarity of Russian and Ukrainian). The war came 
12 Initially, groups present at the Euromaidan had included 
e.g. gay interest groups which later hid under pressure 
from the Right Sector. 
The war came as a shock which was aptly 
expressed by the poet Anastasiya Dmytruk 
in the words “We will never be brothers”.
There emerged a trend involving a strong 
rejection – which had previously been 
absent in Ukraine – of all things Russian, 
which generally used to be perceived 
as close, even brotherly.
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as a shock which was aptly expressed by the 
poet Anastasiya Dmytruk in the words “We will 
never be brothers”. This shock contributed not 
only to an increased awareness of how separate 
Ukrainian identity and culture is from Russia’s 
– it inspired the view that also in the past “we 
actually never were brothers”13. Previously, this 
view was promoted only by radical nationalists, 
not necessarily being the followers of OUN tra-
dition. 
This new nationalism avoids making references 
to Banderite ideology or to the OUN tradition. 
It does, however, draw inspiration from OUN-
UPA symbols and the memory of UPA fighting 
the Soviet Union’s forces and the Third Reich 
forces (the scale of the latter fighting is exag-
gerated beyond measure). In the new circum-
stances, these symbols and this memory have 
lost their party and political connotations to 
become nationwide symbols (although they 
are not yet generally accepted). This is partly 
due to aggressive Russian propaganda which 
was criticised by an unnamed Euromaidan 
member in Zaporizhia, who said: “If the fact 
that I want to live in a better world means that 
I am a ‘Banderite’, then yes, I am a Banderite”14. 
13 The original title of the book by Max Kidruk, in Poland 
published as Ja, Ukrainiec [I, the Ukrainian] (Warsaw 
2015) is Nebratni [Unbrotherly]; and the book itself 
is largely devoted to this issue.
14 Piotr Pogorzelski, Ukraina. Niezwykli ludzie w nie-
zwykłych czasach, Gliwice 2015, p. 40. Cf also: Oksa-
na Forostyna, Poaching, simmering, and boiling: The 
declining relevance of identity discourse in Ukraine [in:] 
What Does Ukraine Think, European Council on Foreign 
Relations, ECFR/133, p. 32. 
The symbols are gaining popularity, which, 
however, does not entail any revival of the Ban-
derite ideology popular in the late 1930s and 
in the early 1940s. 
One manifestation of the increased willingness 
of young Ukrainian citizens (regardless of their 
ethno-linguistic background) to identify with 
the state was the establishment in 2013 of 
the “Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationalists” 
movement. In its manifesto, the movement 
stated: “(1) Ukraine above all; (2) We are Ukrain-
ians”, and expressed its support for a monop-
oly of the Ukrainian language as the state  lan-
guage15. The manifesto also made reference to 
a 1943 resolution of an Extraordinary Congress 
of OUN, in which the organisation dropped the 
demand for the primacy of ethnic Ukrainians in 
the state. The movement has no mass status, 
nor is it widely known; it is likely that it was es-
tablished on the basis of an initiative proposed 
by one of post-OUN organisations. However, 
the very fact that it could be created, confirms 
that a significant change in people’s awareness 
has occurred. This new nationalism, civic nation-
alism, is not entirely without ethnic elements, 
but it is being shared by an ever larger portion 
of residents of all regions of Ukraine. In this way, 
it is gradually losing the status of a “minority 
faith” which it had some 25 years ago16. 
Ukrainian neo-Nazism
Recently, certain neo-Nazi trends with consider-
able potential for development have emerged, 
although at this point their importance seems 
to be slight. They do not refer to OUN tradition 
or the ideological heritage of other organisa-
tions active during World War II. Instead, they 
draw inspiration from contemporary neo-Nazi 
movements, mainly those active in Western 
Europe as well as Russian ones. The fact that 
the best voluntary unit fighting in this war, 
15 After http://рун.укр.target_run, accessed: 3.06.2015. 
16 Cf Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: 
A Minority Faith, Cambridge 1997. 
Creating the concept of nationalism or na-
tional identity as such not on the basis of 
events and controversies from a century 
ago, but on the basis of half-legendary (or 
even made up) ancient history, is likely to 
appeal to individuals supporting different 
views; moreover, it may inspire them to de-
vise further concepts.
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the “Azov” regiment, uses these symbols and 
rhetoric, fosters a popularisation of ideas sup-
ported by the regiment’s leadership (in October 
2014, a march organised by “Azov” in Kyiv gath-
ered five times more participants than a rally 
organised on the same day by the neo-Bander-
ite Svoboda party; on the same day, Azov or-
ganised rallies in Odesa and in Kharkiv, where 
the largest form of protest Svoboda could or-
ganise would be a picket line). 
This seems to be another manifestation of the 
generation change: the memory of World War II 
is seeing the gradual development of an in-
creased openness to the world growing up 
alongside it. Symbols such as the ‘Wolfsangel’ 
or the Black Sun are not historical references, 
but manifestations of a pan-European trend 
followed by neo-rightist organisations. Simi-
larly, Slavic neo-paganism is gaining populari-
ty among Ukrainian nationalist groups. These 
groups support e.g. modern (anti-immigrant) 
racism, which often takes an extremely dras-
tic form, as well as anti-liberal views similar 
to those advocated by their Western Europe-
an counterparts (involving both the economic 
and the social aspect of liberalism). In Ukraine, 
these views have become anti-Western views. 
Interestingly, however, these groups are unan-
imous in their support for Ukraine’s member-
ship of NATO, and a large portion of them are 
proponents of Ukraine joining the EU (for geo-
political reasons). 
It comes as no surprise that “Azov”, whose mem-
bers include few representatives of Ukraine’s 
western oblasts, uses blue-yellow flags 
(i.e. state flags) and not the red-black ones. 
What may be surprising, though, is that a new 
justification of nationalism is emerging in these 
groups: it makes reference to the Old-Russian 
state (Kyivan Rus, Ukraine-Rus) which has to 
fight the “eastern hordes” currently symbolised 
by the Russian state.
Equally surprising is the new, racist concept 
of the Ukrainian nation put forward by Andriy 
Biletsky17. In his view, it is not the language 
but race that is the foundation of a nation – 
the language undergoes historical changes, 
whereas race, at least the Ukrainian race, has 
remained the same for millennia (according to 
this concept, the Ukrainian nation/race has ex-
isted since the times of the Trypillian culture, 
i.e. since ca. 4000-3000 BC)18. Should this view 
become popular, it will be a turning point for 
Ukrainian nationalism. One of its consequenc-
es might be ultimate permanent split between 
‘neo-nationalists’ and traditional nationalist 
groups for whom language remains the apple 
of the eye of the nation’s existence. 
It seems that the national identity projects dis-
cussed in this article have considerable devel-
opment potential also in groups which avoid 
any connection to neo-Nazism. Neo-Nazism 
itself is likely to remain a niche movement 
(although the number of its members is expect-
ed to grow). Similarly, Slavic neopaganism is 
unlikely to become a mass religious and polit-
ical movement. However, creating the concept 
of nationalism or national identity as such not 
on the basis of events and controversies from 
a century ago, but on the basis of half-legend-
ary (or even made up) ancient history, is likely 
to appeal to individuals supporting different 
views; moreover, it may inspire them to de-
vise further concepts. This seems possible all 
17 Andriy Biletsky, born in 1979 in Kharkiv to a family with 
noble and Cossack roots, had been a member of the So-
cial-National Party of Ukraine which he left in 2003 after 
it was transformed into the less radical Svoboda party. 
Next, he headed the Patriot of Ukraine organisation; 
in nationalist circles he was known as the White Leader. 
In 2014, he was the main organiser and the first com-
mander of the voluntary “Azov” battalion (later turned 
regiment); he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel of 
police. In the 2014 elections, he ran as an independent 
candidate and won a parliamentary seat; he doesn’t 
joined any parliamentary grouping. 
18 Cf Slovo Biloho Vozhdia (a collection of texts by Biletsky), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140924041340/http://rid.
org.ua/knigarnya/AB/slovo.pdf; accessed: 24.06.2015, 
pp. 28-31; also: Vyacheslav Likhachov, Batalion ‘Azov’ 
i politichieskiye ambitsii neonatsistov, http://eajc.org/
page18/news46972.html; access 24.06.2015. 
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the more so since the younger generation has 
been influenced by fantasy books and is thus 
more open to such narratives than the older 
generation, whose minds were shaped by “clas-
sic” historical novels19. Similarly, it seems that 
anti-liberalism (in its broader sense) has a cer-
tain growth potential because it is at pains to 
offer remedies for contemporary challenges 
and not historical ones. This is not an exclusive-
ly Ukrainian phenomenon – in several European 
countries ‘the new right’ is becoming radical-
ised as it adopts nationalist, anti-immigrant 
and anti-liberal views (often tantamount to an-
ti-capitalist views, which brings them closer to 
slogans supported by radical left). 
In Ukraine, these views and organisations 
(including neo-Nazi views and organisations) 
may be expected to develop at a faster pace 
due to the fact that this country has not been 
exposed to major educational projects carried 
out in the spirit of liberalism (as has been the 
case in Western Europe and also in Central Eu-
rope, although for a shorter period). Still, there 
are no major liberal or conservative parties 
(which could be described as liberal or con-
servative in terms of their actual political plat-
form, not just in terms of their declared views), 
and traditional left parties have been totally 
compromised mainly due to their dominant 
post-Soviet/pro-Russian agenda. The political 
scene has been dominated by different versions 
of national-democratic (including nationalist) 
platforms as well as by national-radical ones. 
War fosters a radicalisation of attitudes and 
views and hinders liberal attitudes. A war that 
is lost (and Ukraine is still at risk of losing the 
current war) often entails the emergence of 
anti-democratic resentments. A dramatic de-
cline in the economic situation, which translates 
into limited opportunities for the younger gen-
eration, is likely to promote political radicalism.
19 The larger issue of the influence of contemporary popu-
lar culture on political attitudes has not been researched 
in detail, especially in the case of post-Communist socie-
ties, but the influence itself is unquestioned. 
Which nationalism?
At this point it is unclear what the future di-
rection of the development of the Ukrainian 
nationalist movement might be. It seems cer-
tain that the movement has now found itself at 
a crossroads and that it is undergoing a change 
comparable to the one which brought about 
the concept of integral nationalism back in the 
1920s. The pace, the scope and the main di-
rection of this change will largely depend on 
how long the current “frozen war” in Donbas 
will last, as well as on the severity of the so-
cial cost (especially for the younger genera-
tion) of reforms which are being carried out, 
albeit in an inconsistent manner. It is beyond 
doubt, though, that “neo-nationalist” (and also 
“neo-leftist”) movements and organisations are 
now facing new development opportunities.
The events which took place over the last two 
years have brought about an expansion of na-
tionalist views and attitudes within society. 
At the same time, society seems to have lost its 
previous radicalism and especially its ethnocen-
trism. A new attitude referred to as “civic na-
tionalism” has emerged, focused on the state 
and promoting ethnic pluralism. On the other 
hand, a neo-Nazism has emerged which does 
not support the ethnic concept of a nation. 
Organisations which support ethnic exclusivism 
in the spirit of the former OUN, have remained 
on the margins of the current transformations.
However, there are not grounds to expect 
the emergence of a mass nationalist political 
movement characterised by a paramilitary or 
totalitarian structure, capable of carrying out 
long-term consistent actions. It is more likely 
that several short-lived organisations, groups 
and movements will appear whose actions 
will be influenced for example by the current 
intellectual fashion and by the popularity of 
certain symbols. This is confirmed by develop-
ments observed to date (including in recent 
months) which emphasised the potential of 
the Ukrainian anarchist-democratic tradition. 
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This situation is also likely to be consolidated 
by a certain interest in nationalist organisations 
on the part of politicians and oligarchs. They in-
tend to support (and sponsor) these groups in 
pursuit of their own goals, but at the same time 
they would like to keep these groups contained. 
It remains an open question whether and to 
what extent the current and future organisa-
tions will become able to carry out successful 
political action.
